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DESIGN PIRACY
MAURICE A. WEIKART*
The very name "design piracy" has been called a mis-
nomer, a clever labeling of certain lawful acts with the
stigma of bloodshed and robbery on the hngh seas. This
criticism of terms seems entirely justified; "copying" rather
than "piracy" would seem to be a term much better adapted
to an analytical discussion of the design-protection problem
and will be used henceforth in this paper. In 1914 the agi-
tation for protection against copying of non-functional de-
signs which could neither be patented under the design-
patent statute, nor copyrighted, first became articulate in
the form of a bill introduced to the sixty-third Congress by
Hon. W. A. Oldfield, the then Chairman of the Commission
on Patents in the House of Representatives.' This bill was
the direct result of judicial decisions interpreting the patent
statutes and of rulings of the Librarian of Congress as to
the copyright statutes. Non-functional designs, involving no
strict originality had long been held by the courts not to be
patentable under the Patent Statutes. To allow the protection
of non-functional designs, Design Patent statutes were en-
acted in 1842, reenacted in 1861, 1870, and revised in 1902.
However, wisely or unwisely, judicial decision 2 soon re-
quired under the design-patent law the same quality of "in-
vention" (i.e., must differ from prior devices not merely by
changes that could be produced by a skillful worker in the
particular art involved, but by completely original changes
that could be produced only by inventive genius) as was
required under the regular patent law. Most of the non-
functional designs in the growing clothing industry fell out-
side this requirement. The Copyright Law was equally un-
satisfactory. Section 5 (g) of the Copyright Act read as
follows:
Sec. 5. Classification of works for registration. The applica-
tion for registration shall specify to which of the following
classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs: ***
(g) Works of Art; models or designs for works of art.
* Now in the Armed Forces of the United States.
1. H.R. Rep. No. 11321, 63d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1914).
2. Eloesser-Heynemann Co. v. Kuh Bros., 297 Fed. 831 (C.C.A.
9th, 1924); Steffen et al v. Steiner et al., 232 Fed. 862 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1916). (235)
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The Librarian of Congress promulgated rules, defining the
section as follows:
Rule 12 (g) Works of Art and models or designs or works of
art. This term includes all works belonging
fairly to the so-called fine arts (paintings, draw-
ings, and sculpture).
These rules impliedly excluded dress designs, patterns, textile
designs, etc.3 The result was that non-functional designs
which were not completely "original" in the patent sense
were not connected with the fine arts and were unprotected.
The 1914 attempt to get legislative relief represented
the first stirring of the movement to secure complete design
protection covering the designs beyond the copyright and
design patent law. The first design-patent bills were drawn
to cover all non-functional designs, no particular industries
were excluded. Though, as may be plainly seen, design pro-
tection problems cover all industry and all designs, perhaps
the industry in the greatest need of relief, since it relies
chiefly on designs which are unpatentable and beyond the
Copyright Act, is the garment and textile industry. This
article deals chiefly with this phase of the design-protection
problem.
The first design bills of 1914, it is important to note,
were introduced just about the time when the ready-made
apparel industry of the United States was beginning its
development into the million-dollar proportions it possesses
today. Though "ready-made" clothing got its start back
in Civil War days, up until 1893 the custom tailors and man-
ufacturers paralleled each other in supplying the demand for
apparel. After that time the manufacturers slowly forged
ahead-the custom tailor became for all practical purposes
a thing of the past, "store clothes" ceased to be a novelty.
There are several reasons for the demise of the tailoring
establishment. After 1900, department stores, as we know
them now, and mail-order houses developed rapidly; they
sold good quality "ready-made" clothing at low prices and
were able to dd so because of the large stocks they were able
to carry. The use of automobiles which enabled the village
shoppers to drive into their county-seat town to shop, tended
to develop larger stores and cut out the small town tailoring
3. Kemp & Beatley Inc. v. Hirsch et al., 34 F. (2d) 291 (E.D.
N.Y., 1929); Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss, 2 Fed. 23 (S.D. N.Y. 1880).
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business. With the exception, possibly, of women's apparel,
national advertising did much to swing public taste to cer-
tain brands of men's and children's clothing. The first World
War accelerated the trend. Women found a new "freedom"
during this period of social disturbance. Outdoor life and
sports for women first became a fad and then a permanent
part of feminine life, requiring, of course, a (omplete new
variety of female wardrobe. The Feminist movement which
culminated in women suffrage, was part of the same general
trend.
During the First World War the number of business
women, holding what had previously been men's jobs, in-
creased greatly. The sixteen-dollar a week Kitty Foyle
of 1918 had very little time for sewing and comparatively
ample means for buying ready-made clothes. The result is
obvious-home-sewing and individual tailoring ceased for a
great portion of the American people. The end of the war
in 1918 saw the clothing business becoming z, full-fledged
industry. Nor did its growth tend to slack off in 1918. The
returning soldiers who were by that time completely apathetic
to things military, in general, and olive-drab uniforms in
particular, were a complete new block of consumers for men's
wear.
The same reaction against war-economizing and its de-
emphasis of the luxuries of clothing styles which affected the
returning soldiers caught up the whole general populace and
sent the demand for style-clothing up in everheightening
spirals. As might be expected, prices led thi3 dizzy race,
always danced alluringly just ahead of the demand. As only
a few very wary observers predicted, the end finally came.
Early in 1920, the lethargic and easy-going public began to
realize that, as consumers they were being thoro aghly gouged
by high commodity prices in general and particularly by
high clothing prices. Consumer clubs were formed pledged
to restrict buying of new clothing until manufacturers and
retailers lowered prices. Peculiarly enough, the consumer
attack was rather successful in lowering the demand for
style-clothing, the demand fell off rapidly and didn't again
become normal until 1923.
The 1921 depression was the new clothing industry's
first taste of hard times, by no means its last, however. The
industry in general found itself faced with a fifty percent
19441
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over-capacity in production facilities. In the boom days just
after the war, because of the small amount of capital, in
relation to the large returns, needed to cut in on this new
business, a host of additions were made to the list of gar-
ment and textile manufacturers. The result was too many
small plants with a small average number of employees. An-
other astonishing development had been the rise of the stock-
house or jobbing organization. The jobber bought all the nec-
essary fabrics but turned them all over to the manufacturers
on a contract basis, for cutting, trimming, and finishing. Com-
pleted garments were then returned to the jobber who at-
tended to the selling to the retail trade. By 1924, eighty
percent of women's apparel was turned out through jobbers.
Among the reasons for the jobbers' rise to prominence
was their practice of making manufacturers bid for the work
and thus they secured the lowest possible prices; their over-
head was small because they had no operating factory and
most of them had no designing department, but bought de-
signs from free-lance designers. They employed no travel-
ing salesmen and merely displayed their large stocks to visit-
ing buyers of retail establishments.4
The jobbers were not afflicted with labor troubles which
worried the ordinary manufacturer. They could give im-
mediate delivery and furnish first-hand inspection of goods
sold, not merely take orders as the manufacturers them-
selves were forced to do. This jobber-manufacturer system
encouraged the already flourishing business of copying de-
signs of textiles and finished clothing because jobbers bought
designs from free-lance designers and were not particular as
to whether the same design had already been sold to some-
one else or not. Also giving the design out to several sub-
manufacturers who worked on different parts of the finished
goods, multiplied the chances of copying. Recently, the trend
is for regular manufacturers to take over the high-priced
apparel trade and for jobbers to concentrate on low cost cloth-
ing. It would be a valid inference that since design copying
is magnified under the jobber system, most of the copying as
to women's apparel is done in the low-priced field. This has
proved to be true.5
4. See Copyright Approach in this article for more detailed discus-
sion of the transient buyer system of marketing.
5. Mr. J. M. Golby, Exec. Secy. of Fashion Originator's Guild of
America, in a letter to this author dated July 14, 1941, states,
238 [Vol. 19
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Another change in the industry which tool: place after
1921 was the growth of "hand-to-mouth" buying by the re-
tail buyers. Hand-to-mouth buying is the placing of orders
merely for such quantities as can be sold immediately. This
greatly increased the strain on manufacturers and jobbers
because they had to take the entire responsibility of making
up a stock of goods without any advance orders from re-
tailers during dull seasons. This resulted in an increase in
design copying for it put a premium on guessing ahead of
time what was going to "catch on." It encouraged copiers
to wait until a design-originating manufacturer produced a
popular design and then step in and copy it.
Hand-to-mouth buying also resulted in non-uniform pro-
duction throughout the year for orders poured in asking for
immediate delivery during the actual selling seasons leaving
the manufacturers idle during the off-seasons. Recently this
tendency has been reduced by consumers spreading their
buying throughout the year and not concentrating it, as
they did before 1921, during the spring and fall.
From the above it can be seen that design copying really
did not become a problem until after 1921. It grew contem-
poraneously with the growth of the jobber system, the nat-
ural growth of the industry, and with the practice of hand-
to-mouth buying by retailers. The depression of 1929 and
the lean thirties caused copying to grow to gigantic propor-
tions. Thus, though the first design copying legislation was
attempted in 1914,6 before the ready-made clothdng industry
had assumed anything like the present size, the clothing
industry soon sought an easier way out of the problem than
through national legislation and turned to the courts for the
solution of their difficulties7
UNFAIR COMPETITION APPROACH
Though at one time an action for unfair competition
appeared to be the avenue of escape for the be-deviled tex-
tile manufacturer, it has proven to be a blind alley. The
leading case in the United States and one of the first to
" . . . most of the 'piracy' in our judgment, is done in dresses
that wholesale at $8.75 and under."
6. Note 1, op. cit., supra.
7. For a detailed description of the development c-f the clothing
industry in U.S., see Nystrom, The Economics of Fashion, and
Nystrom, Fashion Merchandising.
1944]
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set out the general principles of unfair competition is Mc-
Lean v; Fleming,8 decided in 1877. This case reiterated the
general requirement of palming-off as a proof of actual loss
of customers by the plaintiff. By the early nineteen-hun-
dreds the rules as to imitation of functional and non-func-
tional parts of an article had been established. Where an
article of manufacture was not protected by a patent, any-
one was at liberty to copy the functional parts of the article
in all its forms and features.9 What is functional is, of course,
not a completely objective fact, but in general has been held
to mean parts that are actually necessary for the mechanical
operation of the thing, as distinguished from mere ornamen-
tation. As to non-functional parts, two conflicting rules de-
veloped. A minority line of decisions l developed, of which
Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works," decided
in 1908 is typical. These cases held that though there was
no actual palming-off (i.e. defendant used his own name and
mark on the article) and though there was no secondary
meaning shown (i.e. a definite connection by the buying
public of the appearance of an article with its source), the
imitation would be enjoined if it was "likely to deceive pur-
chasers."
Another line of cases 12 treated the copying of non-func-
tional features as merely a phase of the doctrine of secondary
meaning and held that unless secondary meaning was estab-
lished and there was a failure to negative palming-off, the
copying would not be enjoined. Typical of the spirit of this
rule is Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.'- in which
Judge Learned Hand used the following language, ". . . the
plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through
false representations that those are his wares which in fact
are not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern,
however trifling. The defendant, on the other hand, may
8. 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
9. 22 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 570 (1940).
10. Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co., 198 Fed. 379 (C.C.A. 2nd,
1912) ; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 Fed. 37 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1907).
11. 163 Fed. 939 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1909).
12. Stewart v. Hudson, 222 Fed. 584 (E.D.Pa. 1915); Enterprise
Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Fraey & Clark, 131 Fed. 240 (C.C.A. 2nd,
1904); Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. Kitekle et al., 76 Fed. 758
(C.C.D. Ind., 1896).
13. 247 Fed. 299 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1917).
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copy the plaintiff's goods slavishly down to the minutest
detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff."
The rule represented by the Crescent Tool Co. case is the
rule which has survived. 14 A textile design or dress design
probably cannot be considered to be a functional part of the
finished textile or dress, though the more emphasis that is
placed on style and appearance, the closer design comes to
being actually a functional part of the cloth. However,
whether one considers textile or dress design functional or
non-functional the result is the same-if it is functional
and not patented it can be copied with impunity, if it is non-
functional, since in textile and dress sales secondary mean-
ing is almost never present and since the copier never at-
tempts to palm-off his articles as those of the plaintiffs,
the rule of the Crescent Tool Co. case prevents relief.
COPYRIGHT APPROACH
At common law the author or creator of an intellectual
production has an exclusive "property right" in the subject
of his intellectual effort. One who appropriates it to his
own use can be enjoined as to future appropriation and be
forced to account for profits already received because of
such appropriations. However, by "publicatior" the creator
loses all exclusive rights in his works and the creation passes
into the public domain and thereafter it can be copied for
any purpose with impunity. "General publication" which puts
the creation into the public domain naturally varies de-
pending on the type of literary creation under consideration;
in general, it is a communication, disclosure, or circulation to
any one or more members of the general public, the most
frequent example being the putting on general sale of a copy
of the creation by the creator.'-
The copyright statutes do not destroy the common law
copyright but merely supplement it. By observing the stat-
utory requirements (affixing notice to each copy, registering
with copyright office within six months of the first publi-
cation, etc.) the creator secures to himself the exclusive
right to multiply and sell copies of the creat:ion after pub-
14. Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. (2d) 16 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1939);
Krem-ko Co. v. R. G. Miller & Sons, Inc., 68 F. (2d) 872 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1934); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F. (2d) 450 (C.C.A.
7th, 1930).
15. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S, 284 (1907).
19441
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lication. In other words, statutory copyright takes up where
the common law copyright leaves off-prevents publication
from destroying the creator's exclusive rights. The common
law rule as to publication was accompanied by a modifying
doctrine that a "limited publication," that is, an exhibition to
a limited number of persons for special purposes, was not
such a publication as to put the creation in the public do-
main.16
The "ticker cases" are typical; dissemination of trade
information among certain persons bound by contract,
was held not to be a publication and did not give copiers
the right to appropriate the information. 17  This principle
of "limited publication" would seem to fit exactly the case
where copies are made by spectators at a dress-manufacturer's
style show.
Several weeks before the opening of a dress "season"
the larger manufacturers either separately or in combination
hold a style show at which the models for the coming season
are shown. This exhibition is not open to the public but is
strictly an invitation affair. The invitees include "buyers"
for retail women's wear outlets. Rules of the exhibition
prohibit any sketching or copying of the dresses shown. From
models exhibited at these style shows the buyers make their
orders for the coming season. Exhibition at these shows
seem to fall directly within the limited publication rule, and
thus one who copies designs under these circumstances could
presumptively be enjoined for there has been no general
publication.,'
This still leaves for consideration the case where the
manufacturer puts his dresses or textiles on general dis-
play, either personally, or through retail outlets which have
bought from him, and the copier sketches a copy of the
design, thereafter turning out and selling duplicates of the
design displayed. Here there is certainly a general pub-
lication and therefore the original manufacturer has prima
16. Donaldson v. Becket (H.L. 1774) 4 Burr. 2408. Ferris v. Froh-
man, 223 U.S. 424, 32 Sup. Ct. 263 (1912).
17. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Christie Grain &.Stock
Co., 198 U.S. 236, 25 Sup. Ct. 637 (1905).
18. Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 114 F. (2d) 80 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1940). (Last paragraph
of the opinion by Justice L. Hand relieved the operation of the
Federal Trade Commission order where there has been no gen-
eral publication).
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facie, lost all his rights in the exclusive use of the design.
The morally shocking result thus obtained, i.e., the copier
taking a "free-ride" on the originator's work and investment
in producing an original design, persuaded a few courts to
grant relief on the ground that copying a design by deceit
(for example, where the copying-firm has its agent pose as an
ordinary customer and buy some of originator's merchandise
for the sole purpose of copying it) was unfair competition."
Since it ignores the "palming-off" element of unfair compe-
tition and is therefore completely out of line with established
unfair competition principles, the doctrine of these cases has
not been followed.
In cases where the copier induced disclosure by one
bound by contract with the design-owner not to disclose,
relief might conceivably be obtained under the inducement
of the breach of contract doctrine. Almost any case that would
fit that doctrine would also be a case where there was no
general publication. The common law copyright principles
would therefore furnish a much less precariou3 basis of re-
covery.30
A fleeting ray of hiope appeared when in 1918 the United
States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Pitney,
handed down the decision in International News Service v.
The Associated Press.21 The defendants copied news from
the plaintiff's public bulletin boards, used the news in their
own newspapers-clearly a "free-ride" case. Faced with the
fact that there had been a general publication by the plain-
tiff, Mr. Justice Pitney immediately disclaimed all intentions
of basing the decision on common law coypri~ght principles
and announced that principles of unfair competition were
controlling, and that the defendant's copying of the plaintiff's
news, while it was still "news," to be re-used in competition
with the plaintiff was unfair competition. Since there was
19. Montegut v. Hickson, 164 N.Y. Supp. 858 (1 17). Corinbert
v. Cohn, 169 Misc. 285, 7 N.Y.S. (2d) 351 (1933). (The court
expressly says that exhibiting samples to a few prospective cus-
tomers was a publication, but that "by their inequitable conduct
defendants have precluded themselves from enjoying the rights
of the general public to the disclosure." Relief probably could
have been based on the theory that there had been no general
publication but only a limited publication, under the "ticker cases,"
note 10 supra.)
20. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Christie Grant & Stock
Co., 198 U.S. 236, 25 Sup. Ct. 637 (1905).
21. 248 U.S. 215, 39 Sup. Ct. 68 (1918).
1944]
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no proof of "palming-off" or that defendant was misleading
customers as to the source of the news, Mr. Justice Pitney
found unfair competition to be a rather shaky basis for re-
lief and soon began talking in terms of "quasi-property as
between the- plaintiff and defendant"-which certainly did
not make any clearer the basis on which the decision rested.
In a short, lucid dissent, Holmes stated what is probably the
law today-that the defendant was free to copy the plaintiff's
news after publication, subject only to the condition that
he credit the source of the news and thereby negative any
misleading of customers.
The facts of the usual dress or textile design copying
case seemed to fit rather closely the facts in the International
News Service case. The copier appropriates the design-orig-
inating manufacturer's designs after a general publication
but while the designs are still "news" and uses the copied
design in direct competition with the original design owner.
'A few years later when design copying had grown from an
irritating but economically negligible item to a real problem,
relying chiefly on the decision in the International News
Service case, Cheney Brothers, sued Doris Silk Corporation
alleging the copying of certain Cheney designs by the defend-
ant.22 Cheney Brothers had printed on the selvage of the
goods that it was an original design and that they reserved
all rights against competitive copies. The Doris Company,
nevertheless, copied the design and offered the copies in
competition with Cheney Brothers. The district court denied
an injunction and their decision was affirmed in Cheney
Brothers v. Doris Silk Corporation.23
One of the agreed facts on which the case was decided
was that the defendant knew it was copying a design of the
plaintiff's, thus making the strongest possible case under
International News Service v. Associated Press.2 4
Using the Crescent Tool Case 25 and the Rushmore Case,26
Judge Hand denied relief on the grounds of "secondary"
22. See the statement of Mr. Horace B. Cheney before the Commit-
tee on Patents of House of Representatives. H.R.Rep. No. '7243,
71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930).
23. 35 F. (2d) 279 (1929).
24. See note 14 supra.
25. See nott 1 supra.
26. See note 4 supra.
(Vol. 19
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meaning or "non-functional" imitation.27 He excluded the
applicability of the Associated Press case because as he said,
" . we think that no more was covered than situations
substantially similar to those then at bar. Tide difficulties
of understanding it are otherwise insuperable. We are to
suppose that the courts meant to create a sort of common
law patent or copyright for reasons of justice. Either would
flagrantly conflict with the scheme which Congress has for
more than a century devised to cover the subject-matter."
Judge Hand then acknowledged the obvious injustice of the
result.
"It seems a lame answer in such a case to turn the in-
jured party out of court, but there are larger issues at stake
than his redress. Judges have only limited power to amend
the law; when the subject has been confined to the legisla-
ture, they must stand aside, even though there be an hiatus
in completed justice."
Completely barred from relief in the couits and armed
with Judge Hand's letter of recommendation to the legisla-
ture, the design-originating manufacturers row began to
fight in earnest for design protection legislation. From 1914
on, design protection bills were intermittently before both
the House and the Senate.2s In 1926, Hon. A. 11. Vestal first
27. See "Unfair Competition" in this paper, page
28. (1) H.R. 11321, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1914), by Hon. W. A.
Oldfield, Chairman of the Committee on Patents.(2) H.R. 18223, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1914) by Hon. W. A.
Oldfield, Chairman of the Committee on Patents.
An amended bill.(3) H.R. 6458, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1915) by Hon. W. A.
Oldfield, Chairman of the Committee on Patents.(4) H.R. 14666, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) by Hon. M. A.
Morrison. Sought protection for "Any cesign, new and
original, as embodied in or applied to ary manufactured
product," copyright protection, and regisbation in Patent
Office.(5) H.R. 17209, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) by M. A. Morri-
son. "Any new and original surface design."(6) S. 6925, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) by Hon. Thomas
Taggart.(7) H.R. 20842, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1917) by Hon. M. A.
Morrison.
(8) H.R. 10028, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1918) by Hon. C. B.
Smith.(9) S. 2601, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) by Hon. Arthur Clap-per.
(10) H.R. 7539, 68th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1924) by Hon. A. H.
Vestal. "The Author is one who originates a design and(11) H.R. 1035, 68th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1924) by Hon. A. H.
Vestal. (Bill was drafted by T. Solberg, 11egister of Copy-
right.)
1944]
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introduced a bill to the sixty-ninth Congress. Amended and
re-amended, this bill received the attention of the House
Committee on Patents until 1930 when it was passed by the
House but not by the Senate.
(12) H.I1. 13117, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) by Hon. A. H.
Vestal. See favorable report in H.R. Rep. No. 1521, 68th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1925).
(13) H.R. 13117, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) by Hon. A. H.
Vestal. Copyright based upon registration. Term of pro-
tection, 2 years plus 18 years.
(14) H.R. 9358, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) by Hon. A. H.
Vestal. "The Author is one who originates a design and
contributes intellectual effort to the composition thereof."
(15) H.R. 13453, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) by Hon. A. H.
Vestal.
(16) H.R. 7243, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1929) by Hon. A. H.
Vestal. (Same as H.R. 9358, amended.)
(17) H.R. 7495, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1929) by Hon. W. I.
Sirovich. "Any person who created or is the author of
any creation, style, and/or design may secure a copyright."
(18) H.R. 11852, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930) by Hon. A. H. Ves-
tal. No limitation of classes of articles; term of protection, 2
years plus 18 years. (Passed House July 2, 1930.)
(19) H.R. 11852, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930) in Senate July
3, 1930. Senate Committee hearings were Jan. 8, 1931.
Bill amended as follows: protection limited to (1) textiles,
laces, and embroidtries of all kinds; (2) furniture;
(3) lamps and lighting fixtures; (4) shoes and other foot-
wear; (5) jewelry or articles manufactured from precious
metals. Term of protection, 2 years plus 18 years. Re-
ported to Senate Jan. 26, 1931.
(20) H.R. 138, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1931) by Hon. A. H. Vestal.
This bill amended H.R. 11852. "This act shall not apply
to or include designs for automobiles and for containers
made of glassware and the like."
(21) S. 138, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1931) by Hon. Felix Herbert.
(22) H.R. 12897, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) by Hon. W. I.
Sirovich. "To provide for protection of ladies' handbags,
pocketbooks, vanities, and other designs applicable to pouch
bags and other ladies' novelty handbags."
(23) S. 5057, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) by Mr. Hastings for
Hon. Felix Herbert. "Registration of designs for tex-
tiles, laces and for embroidery of every kind."
(24) S. 241, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) by Hon. W. I. Sirovich
(Same as S. 5075).
(25) H.R. 4115, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) by Hon. W. I. Siro-
vich (Same as S. 241)
(26) H.R. 7359, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934) by Hon. T. A.
Peyser. A bill declaring design piracy to be unfair com-
petition.
(27) S. 3166, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934) by Hon. G. P. Nye.
(28) S.J. Res. 120, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934) by Hon. J. F.
Byrnes. "To secure information regarding the piracy,
imitation, or infringement of designs. . ...
(29) H.R. 5859, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) by Hon. W. I. Siro-
vich. Only applies to textiles, laces and embroidery. Term of
protection, five years. Requires search.
(30) S. 3208, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) by Hon. A. Lonergan.
(31) H.R. 8099, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) by Hon. T. O'Malley.
"Protection for author of a design (1) applied -to surface
[Vol. 19
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The Vestal Bill provided essentially for registration of
designs in the Copyright Office by any citizen of the United
States, "who is author of any design as hereinafter defined
or the legal representative or assignee of said author." The
"author" was designated in the bill as "one who originates
a design and in so doing contributed intellectual effort to
the composition thereof." "Design" was defined as "a pat-
tern, shape, or form of a manufactured product, or dies, molds,
or devices by which a pattern, shape or form may be pro-
duced, original in its application to or embodiment in such
manufactured product and which produces an artistic or
ornamental effect or decoration, but shall not include shapes
or forms which have merely a functional or mechanical pur-
pose."
Section 3 (1) contained a provision that was to subse-
quently provoke a flood of condemnation in the later com-
mittee hearings: "As prerequisite to copyrighit protection
under this act the author or his legal representative or his
assignee must (1) actually cause the design to be applied to
or embodied in the manufactured product." The certificate
issued by the copyright office was to give prima facie evi-
dence of the date of the creation of the design, etc., in any
subsequent judicial proceedings. It provided for a reasonable
marking of the goods giving notice of the regihtration. The
period of protection was for two years from tshe first sale
with the opportunity for an eighteen-year extension. In-
fringement was defined to include "colorable imitation of the
copyright design or of any characteristic original feature
thereof in manufactured products of the same class, or any
similar product; or selling or publicly distributing or ex-
posing for sale any such product embodying su2h a colorable
imitation." This last phrase secured for the bill the bitter
and undying enmity of the large department-store retailers.
of any textile fabric, (2) is result of original weave of
any fabric, (3) compromises the same shape or form of a
manufactured product." Term of protection, five years.(32) S. 3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). Contains Senator
Vanderburg's Amendment to include "mod els or designs
intended to be embodied in manufactured -products." Term
of protection, 20 years. No search. Excepts automobile
industry (Note that Senator Vanderburg was from Michi-
gan).
The above list comprises thirty-two bills. Of these, five were
reported out of conmittee, two passed; the Vestal Bill passed the
House and the Duffy Bill, including Vanderburg Araendment passed
the Senate.
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They balked at thus defining infringement at every turn.2 9
Prior to the 1928 committee hearings, the bill was
amended to provide, "If such sale or public distribution or
exposure for sale or public distribution is by anyone other
than the manufacturer of the copy or colorable imitation, it
shall be unlawful only as to goods purchased after actual
notice in writing that the design is copyrighted." It was
the hope of the House Committee on Patents when they
began their hearing of the bill that this amendment would
placate the retailers. Section 9 of the bill excepted from the
operation of the bill, (1) repair parts manufacturers; (2)
family dressmakers; (3) fashion magazines printing dress
designs; and (4) the motion picture industry in general.
These exceptions represented the bitter fight of previous
committee hearings; each one was the result of organized
opposition to the bill by the particular group affected. Hoping
it had eliminated most of the difficulties the House Commit-
tee began its hearings on H.R. 9368 on March 16, 1928.
The most persistent and vociferous opponents of the
Vestal Bill soon came forward with their objections. The
National Retail Dry Goods Association,30 speaking through
Mr. Lew Hahn, a director of that organization, and Mr. P. L.
Ryan of R. H. Macy and Co., New York City, flatly refused
to support a bill which did not require a search, similar to
the design patent system, in order to determine the orig-
inality of the applicant's design. Of course, this struck at
the very heart of the bill, for one of the principle failures of
the design-patent law was the necessity for a search which
resulted in approximately a six-month interval between the
application and the granting of a design patent.3 1 This re-
quirement was completely unsuited to the fleeting popularity
and value of style-merchandise. The bill was drawn so that
a retailer might sell the whole stock on hand of a particular
infringing design even after notice of the infringement. What
it did forbid was re-orders of infringing goods.
29. Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H.R. 9358, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1929). Statements of Mr. Hahn at 25 and of
Mr. Ryan at 40.
30. This trade association comprises some 3000 stores located through-
out the United States, but principally represents the large de-
partment stores of the country.
31. Hearings before tht House Committee on Patents on H.R. 9358,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1929) 7. Statement by Mr. H. D. Williams,
representing the American Bar Association.
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The result was that a premium would be placed on being
able to tell when one design infringed another so that the
retailer could, if he thought it safe, deliberately spurn the
complaining company's notice and continue to re-order. To
be able to do this the retailer would have to maintain a de-
sign-infringement staff of investigators. This extra expense
the retailers, especially the large department stores, were not
anxious to assume.
At a later hearing on the Vestal Bil 3 2 the retailers again
attacked the bill on the ground that it put the responsibility
of determining what was an infringement on the retailer.
Section 3 of the bill was also attacked because, it was con-
tended, it shifted the protection from the author of the de-
sign to the manufacturer-owner of the design.33 Section 3
of the bill provided that one of the prerequisites of registra-
tion of a design was that the author or his assignee "must
actually cause the design to be applied to or embodied in
the manufactured product." Obviously under this provision
the struggling young designer received no protection from
the copying of his designs unless he procured a patron who
would use it in an actual product and embody it in a manu-
factured article. This provision, however, had been put into
the bill to block the flood of design-registrations if the bill
was enacted. It was hoped that this requirement would
restrict the registration, more or less, to the professional
designers and keep out the registrations of cranks. This
provision of Section 3, in spite of opposition, remained in
the bill.
Supported by the American Bar Association and prin-
cipally by manufacturers and designers of style-apparel, op-
posed principally by the Retail Dry Goods Association, the
Vestal Bill was introduced into the House and passed by that
body on July 2, 1930. To fully realize what a triumph this
was for the bill's supporters, one must remember that with
the exception of a few industries (fashion news magazines,
repair parts manufacturing) this bill covered the whole field
of non-functional design.
The bill went into the Senate Committee on Patents
32. Hearings before the House Committee on Patent3 on H.R. 7243,
71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930).
33. Statement of Mr. H. D. Ames, Chairman of the resign Copyright
Committee of National Retail Dry Goods Association. Op. cit.
spra note 32.
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on January 8, 1931. By this time many industries had been
aroused and opposed the Vestal Bill -vigorously.34 This op-
position won out in the Senate Committee. The bill was
amended to limit protection to (1) textiles, laces and em-
broideries; (2) furniture; (3) lamps and lighting fixtures;
(4) shoes; (5) jewelry. Dress-designers were left unpro-
tected, except for two-dimensional textile designs.
The bill was reported to the Senate January 26, 1931,
but the seventy-first Congress adjourned before any action
was taken. This took the supporters of the bill right back
to where they had started-with the additional adverse ef-
fect of having thoroughly alarmed the automobile industry,
glass-manufacturing industry, pottery industry, and others
who felt no crying need for any change in the status quo
of design protection. From this time on the popularity of
the Vestal Bill rapidly waned. In the next session of Con-
gress the bill was re-introduced with amendments excluding
*the automobile, glassware, and several other industries from
protection. In these hearings the American Bar Association
withdrew its support of the bill.3 5
The new bill provided for a search but under Such im-
proved conditions that the protection could be given within
three days after application. The registration was to be
taken care of through the Copyright Office and the bill was
made to refer to "design protection" and thus was kept out
of either of the old categories of patent or copyright. It
was limited to flat, two-dimensional designs only. At first
the House Committee on Patents imagined it finally had a
bill that pleased almost everyone. But from 1932 to 1936,
throughout the hearings on the bill, one by one, its support-
ers deserted the fight. Fashion magazine publishers, ' the
automobile industry,3 railroad car manufacturers, 31 agricul-
34. A good example of this sort of opposition is contained in the
statement of Mr. Isaac Laude in Hearings before the Committee
on Patents on H.R. 7243, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930) 95.
35. Hearings before Committee on Patents on H.R. 138, 72nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932) 87. Statement by Prof. Karl Fenning.
36. Hearings before Committee on Patents on H.R. 138, 72nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932) 74.
37. Hearings before Committee on Patents on H.R. 8099, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 15.
38. Hearings before Committee on Patents on H.R. 8099, 74th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1936) 786.
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tural machinery manufacturers, 39 glass container industry"o
-all joined the swelling chorus of opposition. Until 1935 the
bill never reached the floor of either the House or the Sen-
ate. On July 29, 1935, the bill was passed br the Senate.
However, it contained Senator Vandenburg's amendment
which radically changed the old bill. It did away with the
requirement of search and provided merely for registration
of designs. It covered the whole field of design and exempted
only the automobile industry.
At the later House Committee hearings on this new bill,
the retail department stores immediately reiterated their old
stand against any design protection legislation not involving
the principle of search, they went even further and announced
that although "retailers did attempt to get together with
supporters of the Sirovich bill (requiring a search), never-
theless that attitude on the part of the retailers was ill-
advised," and that they now opposed any sort of design
protection legislation whether it involved the principle of
search or not.41 This bill was never acted upon in the House.
From this time on a general lull occurred in all attempts
at design protection legislation, scattered committee hear-
ings considered the problem, but, in general the textile and
finished garment manufacturers slowly began to realize that
relief through legislation was almost as improbable as relief
through the courts.
ATTEMPTS BY THE INDUSTRY ITSELF TO SOLVE
THE DESIGN COPYING PROBLEM
In 1932, soon after the discouraging failure of the Vestal
Bill, the dress and textile manufacturers, under the impetus
of the N.R.A.,4 2 began an attempt to remedy the copying
malady by voluntary cooperation within the industry. The
39. Op. cit. supra note 36, 35.
40. Op. cit. supra note 36, 57.
41. Op. cit. supra note 37, 840.
42. Under the N.R.A. the design problem was worked out in the code
of each separate industry, and no uniform design copying code(as was first proposed) was established. The resulting non-
uniformity and confusion brought only occasiorial enforcement
of the design codes. Out of 175 codes, 100 of them made no
specific reference to the design copying problem. For an ex-
haustive study of design protection under the N.R.A. codes see
the brief of Mr. Karl Fenning of Washington, D.C. Hearings
before the Committee on Patents, House of Reps., seventy-fourth
Congress, first session (May 23, 1935).
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only project of this sort to attain any sort of success was
the Fashion Originators' Guild of America. This organiza-
tion consisted at first of about fifteen of the leading dress-
manufacturing houses in the United States. Its mainstay
was a "declaration of cooperation" which if offered to re-
tailers in the principal cities under which the signers pledged
themselves not to buy dresses which were not originals. The
Guild maintained a detective system which kept close watch
of retail sales, discovered copies, and notified the member-
retailers.
The Guild also provided a "piracy committee" at which
the alleged copy was "put on trial" and at which its manu-
facturer was given a hearing on the issue as to whether the
dress was in fact a copy. From this decision, an appeal could
be had to a mediation board composed of one man chosen by
the copy-manufacturer, one by the complaining manufacturer,
and a third chosen by these two.
A registration bureau was provided wherein manufac-
turer members of the Guild registered all designs on which
they desired the Guild's protection. Manufacturer members
of the Guild were provided with a card-index of all coopera-
tive retailers, retailers who failed to sign the "declaration of
cooperation" or who had signed it but refused to sell only
originals were listed on red cards which were sent to the
manufacturer-members. This system of listing the retailers
gave the Guild its teeth-no manufacturer could sell to a
red-carded retailer, under penalty of rather large fines.4 3
The registration gave no presumption of the originality
of the design registered, merely fixed the date of its first
use, originality was determined later in actual contested cases
before the "piracy committee." Manufacturer-members were
also prohibited from selling to persons who conducted their
business in residences, hotels, or apartment houses, retail ad-
vertising by manufacturers was prohibited, and no manu-
facturer could furnish a retailer with samples for a "style
show" unless the retailer had, in fact, bought the samples
so displayed. These requirements of the Guild received no
particular emphasis, however, the copying problem being
the main reason for the Guild's existence. By 1935 a reg-
istration bureau similar to the Guild's had developed in the
43. One manufacturer-member was fined $1500 by the Guild, another
was threatened with a fine of $5000. 28 F.T.C. 464 (1939).
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textile-manufacturing field, this bureau was maintained by
the National Federation of Textiles Inc. The Guild imme-
diately linked this bureau with its own, adopted this bureau
as the exclusive source from which its manufacturer mem-
bers could pick the textiles from which they nanufactured
finished dresses, member-manufacturers were fined if they
bought textiles from one who had copied textile-designs reg-
istered with the National Federation of Textiles. Obviously,
the effectiveness of the whole scheme depended on the num-
ber of retail outlets and the number of manufacturers which
the Guild could control.
By 1935, about 12,000 retailers had signed the "declara-
tion of cooperation" and the Guild controlled approximately
42 percent of the sales of women's dresses wholesaling for
more than $10.75, 10 percent of those under that price.
The Guild's first test in the courts was Wolfenstein v.
F.O.G.A. 1 The Guild had red-carded a retailer who sold dress-
es from a down-town apartment in New York City. The
retailer secured in the lower New York court, an injunction
against the Guild under New York's Donnelly Act which
made unlawful contracts creating a monopoly in the manu-
facture or sale of commodities in common use. On appeal the
New York Supreme Court reversed the lower court and dis-
solved the injunction. The court indicated that since the
Guild did not refuse to let its manufacturer-members sell to
this retailer, but merely forced those who wanted to buy to
first comply with the conditions required by the Guild, that
the Guild was within the letter or the spirit of the Don-
nelly Act. This reasoning was supplemented by strong re-
liance on Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States.45 When
this decision was later limited in Sugar Institute v. United
States,46 the Guild's position became less secure.
In March, 1936, the United States District Court of
Massachusetts decided Filene Co. v. F.O.G.A.4 7 Here a red-
carded retailer sought an injunction against the Guild under
Section 15 of the Clayton Act. Since the plaintiff had not
posted the statutory bond, the Court decided the case under
the Sherman Act, holding that since manufacturers could
44. 280 N.Y. Supp. 361 (1935).
45. 288 U.S. 344, 53 Sup. Ct. 471 (1933).
46. 297 U.S. 553, 56 Sup. Ct. 629 (1936). See also United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 310 U.S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct. 811 (1940)
47. 14 F. Supp. 353 (1936).
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cooperate with the Guild or 'not, and since members were per-
fectly free to compete among themselves on price, the Guild
was not a violation of the Sherman Act. The Court used as
authority principally the Appalachian Coals", case and Board
of Trade of Chicago v. United States."
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the first circuit, af-
firmed the District Court's position in favor of the Guild,
the case having been brought to them on appeal. 50 This
decision was also based on the dubious authority of the Ap-
palachian Coals case and Board of Trade v. United States.
Previously the Federal Trade Commission had iound the
Millinery Quality Guild (an organization almost identical
with F.O.G.A., but confined to the millinery industry) to be
unreasonably in restraint of trade.- The court distinguished
that organization from F.O.G.A. on the ground that in the
Federal Trade Commission case the Millinery Guild controlled
,"a substantial portion" of the market, which the court said
was not true of the Guild.
In three courts, the New York Supreme Court, the Fed-
eral District Court, and the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
first district, the Guild had been upheld. But April, 1936
saw the beginning of the end. In that month the Federal
Trade Commission began its hearing on the Guild's practices
which allegedly were in unreasonable restraint of trade.52
In February, 1939, the Commission issued its cease and desist
order against the Guild, compelling the Guild to cease coercing
its members to sell only to retailers who cooperated with the
Guild. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the second circuit and in July, 1940, that court upheld
the Commission. 53  Judge Learned Hand, who had previously
48. Op. cit. supra note 45.
49. 246 U.S. 231, 38 Sup. Ct. 242 (1917).
50. 90 F. (2d) 556 (C.C.A. 1st, 1937).
51. In matter of Millinery Quality Guild, 24 F.T.C. 1137 (1937).
52. In matter of Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc., et
al., 28 F.T.C. 430 (order issued Feb. 8, 1939). The Federal Tradt
Commission itself has never attempted to clamp down on design
piracy as unfair competition for it was generally conceded that
in such controversies the requisite public interest on which thejurisdiction of the Commission depends is not present. 15 U.S.C.A.
§45, (1927); cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S.
19, 50 Sup. Ct. 1 (1929).
53. Federal Trade Commission v. Fashion Originators Guild of
America, Inc., 114 F. (2d) 80, (C.C.A. 2nd, 1940).
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decided Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Co.,54 wrote the opinion.
He indicated that although the Guild did not attempt to fix
prices and therefore United States v. Socony-Va2uum Oil Co.55
did not control, yet the Guild was within the spirit of the
prohibition in that case, and since the common law of unfair
competition and of copyright afforded no legal basis for the
Guild's action, the Guild was by coercion of numbers prevent-
ing retailers from doing what they had a clear common law
right to do-sell copies of original dresses. The court said
that the case was indistinguishable from Filene Co. v. F.O.
G.A.s6 and indicated that it was consciously deciding contra
to that decision.
Thus in five times before the courts andi once before
the Federal Trade Commission, the Guild had been upheld
three times and condemned three times. The First and Sec-
ond Circuits had disagreed on the Guild's legality under the
Sherman Act. Because of the conflict, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and in March, 1941, decided Federal Trade
Commission v. F.O.G.A.5 7 holding that the Commission's
cease and desist order against the Guild was proper. Justice
Hugo Black wrote the opinion in which, relying on the Socony-
Vacuum case, he upheld the Commission's refusal to hear
any evidence of F.O.G.A. as to the evils of design copying
and the consequent reasonableness of the combination. The
Guild's lack of control of the industry was held unimportant,
since the purpose of the Federal Trade Commission was to
prevent monopolies in their incipiency.
The decision did not affect Judge Hand's ruling that the
Commission's order should not apply to cases where retailers
have bought, dresses access to the design of which had been
procured (1) by fraud, bribery, or any othe r crime, (2)
through some breach of contract, (3) before "publication."
These exceptions were the exact fact situation3 under which
the courts had always allowed legal relief against copiers, the
inadequacy of this sort of confined relief, however, had been
the very thing that had called the Guild into b3ing, and thus
was small consolation for the Guild's death-knell in the prin-
cipal holding. Since this decision of the Supreme Court, the
54. Op. cit. supra note 16.
55. Op. cit. supra note 46.
56. Op. cit. supra note 50.
57. 312 U.S. 457, 61 Sup. Ct. 703 (1941).
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Guild has fought design-copying in every way left open to it,
but the importance of F.O.G.A. in the women's dress indus-
try has declined to a very great extent.
EPILOGUE
In this writer's opinion, there is probably slightly more
reason to protect non-patentable and non-copyrightable de-
signs, in the style-merchandise industry, than to leave pro-
tection in the status quo. In the women's clothing and tex-
tile industry, style has become the dominant factor, wear and
durability are de-emphasized-yet the patent and copyright
statutes of the early nineteen hundreds protect functional,
durability processes but give no protection whatever to style
designs. Protection furnished emphasizes the functional,
which, in this one industry, has become outmoded.
The demand is for dresses and textiles original in de-
sign, the manufacturer who tries to meet this demand, by
retaining a design department and by closely analyzing fash-
ion trends, finds small reward for his efforts. Copying
manufacturers attach themselves to him like parasites-grab
up the "hits" and proceed to wring the profit out of the
originator's effort in a few weeks.
But of course this is only half the argument. In any
sort of design protection, at some place along the line, some-
one is going to have to take the risk of the alleged copy
turning out to be not a copy at all. In the no-search, regis-
tration type of design protection, this risk is thrown on the
retailer. His argument to the old Vestal Bill is almost un-
answerable. It is true that generally under a registration-
type statute, he will have to decide for himself whether the
dress he is selling, made by Y Co., is a copy of X's registered
original design. The risk will fall on him-this will reuqire
an added staff of experts and an additional increment added
to the cost of distribution before the dress reaches the con-
sumer. Under the search-type of legislation that risk is
shifted from hirh-he has the assurance that, when X claims
Y's dress, which he is selling, is a copy, X's contention is
backed up by a search through a voluminous well of already
registered designs. And yet the search-type law has its dif-
ficulties. Naturally there is the element of time. A govern-
ment staff of searchers would have to operate quickly or the
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style-life of the design would be over long before protection
could be secured.
Likewise, where in the beginning would the search of-
fice secure a list of all the designs already "in the public
domain"? Could one get a patent, under this new law, on a
polka-dot design if he got the application in before anyone
else? Obviously not. But pick a design that has not had
such general use-then who will say absolutely that it is
in the public domain? These questions begin to hit at the
real heart of the difficulty in search-statutes.
There seems to be no satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem. It can certainly be said, however, that a hundred years
from now people will look back with amazement on the laws
of the nineteen thirties and forties which refused protection
to the non-functional designs of such great designers as Nor-
ma Bel Geddes, and yet gave protection to the creators of
"Superman" and "Little Orphan Annie."

